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Abstract— Security in the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is 
a very challenging task because of their dissimilarities with the 
conventional wireless networks. The related works so far have 
been done have tried to solve the problem keeping in the mind the 
constraints of WSNs. In this paper we have proposed a set of 
cellular automata based security algorithms (CAWS) which 
consists of CAKD, a Cellular Automata (CA) based key 
management algorithm and CASC, a CA based secure data 
communication algorithm, which require very small amount of 
memory as well as simple computation. 
 
Index Terms—Key pre-distribution, Reversible Cellular 
Automata (RCA), Secure data communication, Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) has become a very 
emerging field in computer science now-a-days due to its 
multifarious applicability that includes military 
applications, industrial applications, home applications, 
monitoring temperature, humidity, vehicular movement etc. 
[1]. Besides this, as there are lot of areas in it that can be 
improved further, it has become a very interesting field of 
research also. 
The security threats of a WSN are different than 
conventional mobile networks. A large number of sensors are 
used here compared to other mobile networks. They can be 
extended or curtailed dynamically because here the sensors 
can be added or removed easily after the deployment. Not only 
these, the sensors may be deployed in the hostile areas that 
increase the chance of attacks by the adversaries [2]. That is 
why the research methodologies for the security of WSNs are 
little bit different also. According to the Perrig et al [3] the 
security properties of the sensor networks are data 
confidentiality, data authentication, data integrity and data 
freshness. Different researchers are currently doing research in 
the field of WSN’s node management, data authentication, 
data security, node integrity etc. In this paper we have 
proposed a set of algorithms collectively known as CAWS for 
the key pre-distribution and secure data communication using 
Cellular Automata (CA). 
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The remaining portion of this paper is organized as below. 
Section II provides a brief overview of WSN, CA and 
Reversible CA. In Section III, we have discussed the related 
research works in brief. Section IV and V contains CAKD and 
CASC, i.e. our proposed key pre-distribution algorithm and 
secured data communication algorithm respectively. In Section 
VI, we have analyzed our algorithms. Finally, we have 
concluded our paper in Section VII. 
  
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) 
WSNs are composed of a large number of sensor nodes. 
Generally WSN architecture has four key features: i) it is self- 
organized, ii) it can take the decision locally, iii) it supports 
wireless communication and iv) its traffic flow is almost 
unidirectional towards the destination or 'sink' [4]. A sensor 
node has embedded processor and storage system. But unlike 
traditional wireless network, sensor devices in WSN have 
limited computation and communication capabilities and 
limited energy because they are battery powered. The sensor 
nodes can collect the data, analyze them, and send them to a 
destination. The domain of the sensor nodes is known as 
sensor field. They communicate with each other as well as 
with their neighboring domains normally through wireless 
connection. It acquires the information of its location and 
position through either a global positioning system (GPS) or 
some local positioning algorithm. These sensor devices are 
also known as mote, which integrate the processor, 
communication module and power supply into a single unit 
[5]. 
Sensor nodes of WSNs generally use a small, open-source 
operating system named TinyOS. It is developed by University 
of California, Berkeley [4].  
 
B. Cellular Automata (CA) 
A cellular automaton (CA) is a collection of cells on a grid 
of discrete structure. The grid may be one-dimensional or two-
dimensional. Each cell in the grid belongs to one of the finite 
number of states at a time depending on the states of its 
neighboring cells and the state of a particular cell changes with 
time.  This state changing process, which follows some rule, 
continues iteratively for desired time steps. The state of the 
cell may be on/ off or white/ black. The binary, nearest-
neighbor, one-dimensional cellular automata are known as 
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"elementary cellular automata". S. Wolfram studied this type 
of CA. For a three-cell grid there are 2
3
 = 8 possible binary 
states and a total of 2
8
 = 256 elementary cellular automata. A 
3-neighborhood CA can be expressed as [4] 
 
        tx,tx,txf1tx 1ii1ii   (1) 
 
where xi represents a particular cell, xi-1 represents left 
neighbor and xi+1 represents right neighbor of xi respectively, t 
represents the current time and t+1 represents the next time 
period, f is the function which implements the CA rule.  
Cellular automata can be used in cryptography especially in 
the public key cryptography domain. The speciality of the 
finite CA is one way function whose inverse is very hard to 
find. For a given rule, the future states can be found easily but 
the reverse is very hard to get. However, one can design the 
rule in such a manner that it can be inverted easily. 
 
C. Reversible Cellular Automata (RCA) 
 A reversible cellular automaton is a special type of CA 
where every current configuration has exactly one past 
configuration. In RCA the new state of a cell is determined not 
only by the present states of the cell and its neighbors but also 
by the previous state of that cell. A 3-neighborhood RCA can 
be expressed as [4] 
 
          1tx,tx,tx,txf1tx i1ii1ii    (2) 
 
where xi(t - 1) represents the previous state of the cell xi. 
The reversible cellular automata are not the invert rules of the 
original ones.  
 
III. RELATED WORK 
A. Key Management 
The essential requirement for secure data communication is 
a pair of secret keys. After the initial deployment of a sensor 
node, the secret key is required to communicate with the 
neighboring nodes. This phase where the secret key is 
established for a newly deployed sensor node is known as 
“Key pre-distribution”. But the sensor resource constraints like 
limited power, limited computation ability or low memory 
make this process very difficult.  
There are several key establishment schemes proposed by 
several researchers. The pre-distribution scheme can be 
deterministic or probabilistic. Apart from that there are In-situ 
key establishment schemes also. In the key pre-distribution 
schemes, before the deployment, each sensor node contains the 
keys or keying information. As the network topology is very 
much unpredictable to any sensor node before deployment, the 
extra information regarding key is required here. This 
uncertainty may hamper the performance of the key pre-
distribution schemes [6]. Eschenauer and Gligor [2] proposed 
that every sensor node will have random pre-distribute keys 
loaded in it before the deployment. These keys will be selected 
from a large pool of symmetric keys. At the time of 
communication, the two sensor nodes search that whether they 
have any common key or not and if found, they share the key. 
If common key is not found, then they establish a path key. But 
in this scheme, the attackers may gather the idea and prepare 
the total key pool after considering several sensor nodes.  
Chan et al [7]  proposed a scheme where two nodes require 
q > 1 number of common keys for establishing a shared key. 
The problem in this scheme is that as more than one pair of 
nodes may know the keys, so the key may be revealed by 
capturing a node. 
Besides these, two random key space schemes have been 
proposed by Du et al [8] and Liu and Ning [9]. First one uses 
symmetric matrices to define the key space and second one 
uses symmetric polynomials. The sensors, which want to 
communicate, compute the shared key if they have keying 
information from the same key space. But, modular 
multiplications make the schemes expensive in terms of 
computation, which is a constraint in sensor node. Another 
random key scheme is proposed by Chan and Perrig whose 
name is PIKE [10]. Here two sensor nodes communicate with 
each other with unique pair of keys and if no shared key is 
present then a trusted intermediary establishes the key. 
Another type of key management scheme is in-situ key 
establishment scheme. In this scheme, sensors compute shared 
keys with their neighbors after deployment [6]. But like the 
random key schemes of [8] and [9], in this scheme also, the 
shared key computation process is complex. Another scheme 
proposed by Perrig et al is SPINS [3], which uses a trusted 
base station to establish keys among the sensor nodes. 
Teymorian et al. [6] proposed a cellular automaton based 
key management scheme, CAB, which supports rekeying 
activities. In CAB, each sensor contains a small number of 
CAs before deployment. Using CAs, highly random pair-wise 
keys can be generated using simple bitwise OR and XOR 
operation. In addition to that, the keys can be computed on 
demand by sensors that have a common CA.  
B. Secured Data Communication 
The method of secure data transmission in WSN is more 
difficult than other conventional wireless networks because of 
its constraints mentioned above. There is no adequate memory 
space where the variables of the asymmetric cryptosystem will 
be stored. As far as different type of attacks in WSN are 
concerned, the expected attacks in conventional wireless 
network like the Denial of service (DoS) attacks, time 
synchronization attacks, physical layer attacks, routing threats, 
malicious traffic injection etc. can be possible in WSN also 
[4].  
Roy Chowdhury et al [4] proposed a cellular automaton 
based lightweight data authentication protocol (CADA) which 
not only ensures secure data transmission but also tracks 
malicious motes. In their protocol, the maximum workload is 
given to the sink keeping in the mind the limited 
computational capabilities of the motes.  
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IV. CAKD - KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION ALGORITHM 
While developing the algorithms, we have kept in our mind 
the constraints of the sensor nodes that is  
a) Nodes have computational constraints i.e. complex 
computation should be avoided 
b) Nodes have small amount of memory, so huge data 
can not be stored in the nodes 
c) Nodes get their energy/ power from battery, so extra 
computation will decrease the battery power as well 
as node power also. 
Keeping these constraints in mind we have tried to develop the 
algorithms, which have less complex calculation, take little 
time also. We have developed the algorithms using reversible 
cellular automata (RCA) and used one special property of 
RCA that is [4] 
 
                               YYX,RCAX,RCA    (3)  
 
where X and Y represent previous and current configuration 
respectively [4]. 
In a WSN, there may be several clusters of nodes. Each 
cluster contains a cluster head or base station which acts as 
server and all the motes in that cluster act as clients of that 
base station.  If one mote wants to communicate with another 
mote within the same cluster, then the communication is done 
through the base station.  If one mote wants to communicate 
with a mote of a different cluster, then the communication is 
done through the base stations of the two clusters. The entire 
key pre-distribution operation is depicted in figure 1. 
a) At the time of deployment, a new mote will contain an 
encrypted key (K) of 4 bytes and two unique serial 
numbers S1 and S2 of 3 bytes each. Every mote will have 
these preloaded information which will be kept by a 
central server. After the deployment, a new mote M1 
sends the serial number S1 to its base station. 
b) The base station sends the serial number S1 to the central 
server for the authentication. If any rouge mote sends a 
fake serial number, the central server can identify this. If 
the number is valid then central server will return an 
acknowledgement to the base station along with preloaded 
key K of mote M1 and the second serial number S2 
encrypted using the base station’s key KB of 8 byte size 
which is denoted by P in (4). E represents the encryption 
process. In case of any rouge mote, central server will 
send the failure message to the base station. 
                                S2||KEP
BK
  (4) 
c) The base station after getting the appropriate 
acknowledgement from the central server will first decrypt 
P to get K and S2 and then will generate a 8 byte mote key 
MK and perform an X-OR operation with S2. Then it will 
perform RCA operations as (5) and (6) and send them to 
mote M1. 
                            S2,MKRCAA KB   (5)  
                  
B
KK,RCA  (6) 
d) Mote M1 will perform RCA operations to get the base 
station key KB and its own operating key MK as (7), (8) 
and (9). 
                    BB KK,RCAK,RCAK   (7) 
                 A,KRCAS2M BK   (8) 
                            S2MS2M KK   (9)  
An adversary needs to know both K and S2 to decrypt the 
keys MK and KB. The mote M1 has sent only S1 to the base 
station after deployment. So if any adversary intercepts the 
message, he/ she will not get K and S2. Again, the two serial 
numbers and the key will be used only once because after 
getting the operating key MK, mote will use that key only for 
data transmission, which will be described, in the next section. 
V. CASC - SECURED DATA COMMUNICATION ALGORITHM 
After the key pre-distribution phase, every cluster’s base 
station will contain the pre-distributed operating keys of all the 
motes. In addition to that, every base station will contain the 
secret keys of other cluster’s base stations also. On the other 
hand, all the motes within the cluster contain only a pair of 
keys, viz. the key of their base station and their own secret 
encrypted operating keys.  
a) Let one mote M1 wants to communicate with mote M2. M1 
will generate a random key R of 8 bytes that will work for 
that session only. The total thing has been depicted in 
figure 2. After generating the key, M1 will encrypt the data 
by some encrypting function E and encrypt the random 
key R using its own pre-distributed key MK1 and base 
station’s key KB as (10) and (11) and then send the 
encrypted data and encrypted key R
//
 to base station MB: 
 K11
/
MR,RCAR      (10) 
 1/B1// R,KRCAR   (11) 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Distribution of operating key of a sensor node by the base station 
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b) After receiving the packets from M1, base station will only 
decrypt the key R as (12) and (13): 
 1//B1/ R,KRCAR   (12) 
 1/K1 R,MRCAR   (13) 
 
Then it re-encrypt the random key R using its own key and 
destination motes i.e. M2’s key MK2 as (14) and (15): 
 K22
/
MR,RCAR   (14) 
 2/B2// R,KRCAR   (15) 
After that the cluster head will send the newly encrypted 
key R (in the form of R2
//
) and the encrypted data to mote 
M2.  
c) M2 will first decrypt the random key R as (16) and (17) 
and then will decrypt the original message using R: 
 2//B2/ R,KRCAR   (16) 
 2/K2 R,MRCAR   (17) 
d) Apart from that, if any mote wants to communicate with a 
mote of another cluster then first it will generate the 
random key, encrypt it using (10) and (11) and send it to 
its base station along with the destination address. The 
base station will find the location of the destination, then 
encrypt the key again using its own and destination base 
station’s keys and will send it to destination base station. 
Destination base station will work accordingly and send 
the encrypted data and session key to destination mote 
using the above formulas. 
e) Beside this, every base station will periodically refresh the 
keys of the motes and send them by encrypting it as (18) 
and (19): 
  BNewK1K1/ K,MRCAM   (18) 
        K1/K1K1// M,MRCAM   (19) 
The mote will decrypt it as (20) and (21), discard the  
previous key and store this new key. The data  
communication will be done using this new key until the base 
station will generate the next key and send that to the mote 
 K1//K1K1/ M,MRCAM   (20) 
 K1/BK1New M,KRCAM   (21) 
where MK1 is the previous key of mote M1 and MK1
New
  is the 
newly generated key by the cluster head. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. CAKD algorithm 
Most of the key pre-distribution algorithms either uses 
complex computation or takes much memory space of the 
motes where both of these are constraints of sensor nodes. 
According to our algorithm, each sensor node will have to 
store total 26 bytes of data, one 4 byte key and two 3 byte 
serial numbers which will be pre loaded in the mote before 
deployment, one 8 byte pre-distributed key for the mote itself 
and one 8 byte base station’s key. In the contrast, another CA 
based algorithm CAB [6] needs at least 150 bytes of storage to 
acquire 90% key sharing probability. Figure 3 shows the 
comparison between CAB and CAKD with respect to space 
requirement. Again, there is only one time requirement for the  
 
pre-loaded key and two serial numbers, so if any adversary 
captures any mote, this information will not help him to find 
out the present keys of the mote. In case of pre-distributed key 
of the mote and the base station’s key, as they are 8 bytes in 
size, so 2
64
 combinations are possible for each key, which is a 
huge number. Not only that, the base station will also refresh 
these two keys periodically, so after a period of time, the 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Data communication between two motes using random key R 
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Fig. 3. Comparison between CAB and CAKD with respect to memory space 
requirement  
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adversary will find a new pair of keys. In case of mote failure, 
after the recovery, the mote will start form the beginning using 
CAKD algorithm with pre-loaded K, S1 and S2. 
The operations of key encryption and decryption are also 
easier because here we have used cellular automata based 
computations which uses AND, OR, XOR like simple bit-wise 
operations. 
B. CASC Algorithm 
The secured data communication algorithm uses one 8 byte 
randomly generated session key for each mote. So 2
64
 different 
combinations are possible for each session key. And that key 
will be used for a single session only. Beside this, this 
algorithm has the following properties:  
a) As the session key is generated randomly and is encrypted 
by two pre-distributed keys viz. the mote key and the base 
station’s key so if any adversary somehow manages to 
intercept the packet from the path, he/ she will not be able 
to decrypt the key because for that he/ she has to know 
both the pre-distributed keys which is nearly impossible. 
b) As the pre-distributed keys of each mote will be 
periodically changed by the base station, that will prevent 
replay attack, because if the same message is sent later 
by the adversary, at that time there will be a high 
probability that the key will be changed which will make 
the decryption process impossible. 
       There is another way to prevent replay attack that is the 
source mote can attach a time-stamp with its data that will 
be checked and verified by the base station and the 
destination mote. 
c) This algorithm can prevent Man-in-the-middle attack 
also. If any intruder wants to enter between the sender and 
the receiver, he/ she must know all the pre-distributed 
keys of motes and base station which is nearly impossible, 
because to send a fraud message to the receiver after 
intercepting the original message from the sender, the 
intruder needs to generate another random session key and 
needs to encrypt that using both the sender’s and 
receiver’s key. If he/ she uses his/ her own key, that will 
not be known by neither the sender nor the receiver. 
d) If any unauthorized mote wants to communicate with the 
base station or to any other authorized motes, this can be 
prevented also using this algorithm, because that 
unauthorized mote has to encrypt its session key using its 
own key and the base station’s key. If it somehow 
manages to get the base station’s key then also 
communication cannot be done because the base station 
will not have its entry in its own database. 
e) As the scheme is very much dependent upon the base 
station like SPINS [3], so the base station failure may be a 
big problem. In that case, a provision of a back-up base 
station will be there. A mote with higher configuration 
than the other mote can act as back-up base station. In 
case of main base station failure, that mote will act as the 
base station automatically for the time being. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed CAWS, a set of algorithms 
for key pre-distribution and secured data communication of 
WSNs viz. CAKD and CASC respectively using reversible 
cellular automata. We have also shown that how the 
algorithms perform, how they are able to prevent different 
types of attacks and how they handle different constraints of 
WSNs efficiently. In the future, we will try to improve CAWS 
more in terms of lesser utilization of memory and lesser 
computation complexity.  
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